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FOREIGN BOARD MEMBERS IN RUSSIA’S LARGEST CORPORATIONS: 
A SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE COUNTRY’S 10 BIGGEST FIRMS INVESTING 
ABROAD
A foreigner born outside the former USSR occupies every fi ft h board seat in Russia’s 50 largest corpo-
rations. Unsurprisingly, Russia’s private fi rms more frequently have foreigners on their boards, than 
the state-owned enterprises do. Less than 10 % of the board seats of Russia’s largest state-owned en-
terprises have been given to foreigners, while the respective share in privately-owned fi rms is nearly 
30 %. Th e share of foreigners on the boards of Russia’s biggest fi rms investing abroad is clearly larger 
than in the country’s 50 largest corporations, in general, indicating a correlation between an intensive 
foreign direct investment expansion and a higher proportion of foreigners on the boards of directors. 
Th e British, the Americans and the Germans hold more than half of the board seats given to foreign-
ers, in Russia’s 50 largest corporations. Only two Chinese citizens could be detected among the nearly 
100 foreign board directors. It remains to be seen what the impact of Western sanctions on the future 
board composition of Russia’s largest corporations will be. Th erefore, it is worth following how the 
number of Chinese board members, in Russia’s most signifi cant fi rms, will develop in the coming 
years, since the growing number of board seats usually refl ects increased FDI fl ows. So far, Russian 
statistics show that Chinese investments in Russia are non-existent, and the same applies to Russian 
investments in China, as well.
Keywords: Russian outward foreign direct investment, internationalisation of Russia’s largest 
corporations, corporate governance, board of directors.
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К. Лиухто
ИНОСТРАНЦЫ В СОВЕТАХ ДИРЕКТОРОВ КРУПНЕЙШИХ РОССИЙСКИХ КОРПОРАЦИЙ 
(НА ПРИМЕРЕ 10 ВЕДУЩИХ ФИРМ, ОСУЩЕСТВЛЯЮЩИХ ЗАРУБЕЖНЫЕ ИНВЕСТИЦИИ)
Каждый пятый член совета директоров 50 крупнейших российских корпораций является 
иностранным гражданином, родившимся за пределами бывшего СССР. Нет ничего удивитель-
ного в том, что частные фирмы прибегают к услугам иностранцев чаще, чем государственные 
компании. В случае первых доля иностранцев достигает без малого 30 %, в то время как в слу-
чае последних она составляет менее 10 %. При этом доля иностранцев в советах директоров 
компаний, активно осуществляющих зарубежные инвестиции, заметно превышает аналогич-
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ный показатель 50 крупнейших корпораций. Это позволяет сделать вывод о наличии прямо 
пропорциональной связи между интенсивностью прямых зарубежных инвестиций и  долей 
иностранцев в совете директоров. Представители Великобритании, США и Германии занима-
ют более половины мест, приходящихся на иностранцев в советах директоров 50 крупнейших 
российских корпораций. Одновременно среди примерно 100 иностранных членов советов ди-
ректоров есть только два гражданина КНР. 
Вопрос о том, какое влияние оказывают западные санкции на состав советов директоров 
крупнейших российских компаний, остается открытым. Поскольку увеличение представи-
тельства иностранцев обычно отражает увеличение потоков прямых зарубежных инвестиций, 
особое внимание следует обратить на то, как будет изменяться представительство китайских 
граждан в советах директоров крупнейших российских фирм. На данный момент российская 
статистика свидетельствует об очень небольших размерах китайских инвестиций в  России 
и аналогичной ситуации в отношении российских инвестиций в КНР. Библиогр. 44 назв. Ил. 1. 
Табл. 4.
Ключевые слова: российские прямые зарубежные инвестиции, интернационализации круп-
нейших российских корпораций, корпоративное управление, совет директоров.
Introduction
Over four million enterprises have been registered in Russia [Small and Medium…, 
2014]. Despite a considerable number of fi rms, large corporations, nevertheless, account 
for the majority of the Russian GDP, exports and investments abroad. At the beginning 
of this decade, the Russian outward foreign direct investment (FDI) stock exceeded 
$400 billion. Recently, however, both Russia’s outward FDI stock and outbound FDI fl ow 
have withered, due to three main reasons: 1) lower prices for Russian goods (oil, metals 
and other raw materials) in the world market, causing a lack of capital for new investments, 
2) higher interest rates for bank loans and 3) the Russian Rouble’s weaker exchange rate. 
As a consequence of the slowdown, the position of the Russian outward FDI, in the world, 
has weakened. At the end of 2015, Russian capital represented just 1–2 % of the global 
outward FDI (Table 1).
Table 1. Russia’s outward FDI stock and annual FDI outfl ow in selected years
Indicators 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 2015
Russia’s outward FDI stock
($ million) 3,015 20,141 120,417 433,655 431,865 251,979
Russia’s share in the world’s outward FDI 
stock,  % 0,10 0,28 1,13 2,12 1,67 1,01
Russia’s annual FDI outfl ow
($ million) 358 3,050 12,767 52,616 56,438 26,558
Russia’s share in the world’s
annual FDI outfl ow,  % 0,10 0,27 1,45 3,85 4,17 1,80
Note: Th e FDI fi gures are not constant in all of the UNCTAD reports. Th e author has used the newest available 
UNCTAD data.
S o u r c e s : [UNCTAD. World Investment Report. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. New 
York; Geneva, 2001; 2006; 2011; 2015; 2016].
Over two-thirds of the Russian total outward FDI has landed in the EU, as of June 
2016. However, one should not take the geographical division of the Russian outward 
FDI stock too literally, as a great part of the Russian outward FDI does not stay in the fi rst 
foreign country in which they have been invested. In fact, a substantial share of the Russian 
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outward FDI returns to Russia. As an indication of a massive capital boomerang, one 
can take the FDI moves between Russia and Cyprus. Cyprus covered 33 % of the Russian 
outward FDI stock, and correspondingly, the Cypriot share in the Russian inward FDI 
stock was 29 %, in the middle of 2016 [Central Bank of Russia Russian Direct Investment 
…, 2016].
Russia’s outward FDI is a relatively novel phenomenon, and therefore, it is logical 
that several of its dimensions have not, as yet, been thoroughly studied. Th erefore, this 
article aims at fi lling one of the existing research gaps, as the article explores the corporate 
governance of Russia’s most multinational corporations.
1. Th e study accomplishments and the research objective
Research on Russian outward FDI has grown, hand-in-hand, with growth in the 
Russian outward FDI activity (for a defi nition of FDI, see [OECD Factbook 2010…]). 
However, corporate governance has been a neglected research area, in the context of the 
Russian outbound FDI [Liuhto & Majuri, 2014]. As earlier studies on the Russian OFDI 
did not support the implementation of this research1, the author reviewed earlier fi ndings 
related to the relationship between board composition and an FDI decision by a fi rm, in 
a non-Russian context.
Aft er conducting the literature review, the author decided to focus the analysis on 
foreigners on the boards of directors of Russia’s largest corporations. Th e author decided 
to select the 50  largest corporations, in terms of their 2016  turnover (see Appendix). 
Turnover data provided by the journal, Expert, was used [Expert (2017) Эксперт 400…]. 
A special emphasis, in the analysis, was placed on the foreigners on the boards of directors 
of non-fi nancial companies with the largest assets abroad. A study by Kuznetsov [2016] 
was useful in identifying these companies (Table 2).
Table 2.  Russia’s 10 leading non-fi nancial corporations, in terms of their foreign assets, in 2014
Company, industry Turnover,$ billion 
Foreign assets,
$ billion 
Foreign assets/
total assets,  % 
 1. Gazprom, oil and gas 133,3  36,0 13
 2. Lukoil, oil and gas  98,5  32,9 29
 3. VimpelCom, telecom  9,1  30,4 74
 4. Rosneft , oil and gas  82,3  9,4  6
 5. Evraz, metallurgy  11,9  5,3 46
 6. Sovcomfl ot (SFC), maritime transport  1,0  5,3 83
 7. Rusal, metallurgy  8,1  2,8 19
 8. Russian Railways (RZD), rail transport  45,7  2,8  4
 9. TMK, production of metal pipelines  5,3  2,5 44
10. Zarubezhneft , oil and gas  0,8  2,4 67
Note: Th e turnover fi gures were converted from RUR into USD, using the annual average rate of 2014, i. e. RUR 
38.6 against USD 1 [Bank of Finland (2017) Russia statistics…].
S o u r c e s : [Expert (2017). Эксперт 400…; Kuznetsov, 2016].
1 Tepavcevic [2015] and Liuhto [2017] have analysed the relationship between the ownership and the 
outbound investment of Russian companies. However, none of the aforementioned authors focused on the 
impact of the board composition on the outward investment of Russia fi rms.
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A selection of the 10  largest corporations, with the largest assets abroad, does not 
off er a representative sample, and hence, does not allow us to generalise the fi ndings. 
Despite this limitation, the used method also has its strengths. We should not forget that 
the studied companies account for nearly a third of Russia’s total outward FDI stock. To 
put it diff erently, even if the selected companies do not form a representative sample, they 
form an economically purposeful sample [Merriam, 2009].
Here, we should acknowledge that companies and their governance structures evolve 
constantly, and therefore, it needs to be stressed that the author describes the situation as 
the companies reported it, in their newest annual reports or on their websites, in February 
2017.
In this study, a person who is born outside the USSR and who does not hold Russian 
citizenship is regarded as a foreigner. Th e author could detect several persons who have 
non-Russian citizenship; but, as they were born in the USSR, they have not been classifi ed 
as foreigners. Th e aforementioned defi nition has been created in order to be able to 
accomplish this research. Th e defi nition should not be regarded as a political statement.
Th e main objective of this article is to study foreign members on the boards of directors 
of Russia’s largest corporations, in terms of their turnover. Th e article places special 
emphasis on the role of foreigners, on the boards of Russia’s non-fi nancial companies with 
the largest foreign assets.
2. Earlier empirical research on the relationship between the board composition and 
a fi rm’s internationalisation — with a special focus on foreigners’ roles on the board of 
directors
Sanders and Carpenter [1998] utilised several datasets to collect their data on 
approximately 250 large US fi rms. Th ey discovered that a large board size was positively 
associated with internationalisation. Furthermore, the proportion of outsiders on the 
board was also positively related to a fi rm’s degree of internationalisation.
Sherman et al. [1998] analysed seven regional US telecommunications fi rms and they 
found little to support the indication that board characteristics were related to a fi rm’s 
internationalisation. Similarly, Lien et al. [2005], aft er having analysed over 200 publicly 
listed companies in Taiwan, concluded that there is only limited statistical support for the 
impact of board characteristics upon the decision to undertake FDI. 
Datta et al. [2009] used a dataset consisting of close to 400 acquisitions and 200 joint 
ventures, in the US manufacturing sector. Th eir fi ndings indicate that fi rms with boards 
characterised by a higher proportion of outside directors, independent leadership 
structures and fi rms with a separation of the Chief Executive Offi  cer (CEO) and board 
chair positions are more inclined to favour acquisitions over joint ventures, in their 
foreign market entry. Th e aforementioned fi nding is supported by Majocchi and Strange 
[2012], who found that when the board of a family-owned fi rm has a higher proportion of 
independent directors, international diversifi cation is greater.
Masulis et al. [2011] analysed nearly 10,000 US fi rms, during the period of 1998–
2006. Th eir fi ndings suggest that fi rms with foreign independent directors on their boards 
make better cross-border acquisitions, when they pursue targets from the home regions of 
foreign independent directors. Th ey also found that fi rms with foreign board members pay 
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their CEOs excessively high compensation, but on the other hand, they are less responsive 
to replacing poorly performing CEOs.
Barroso et al. [2011] studied 45  listed Spanish fi rms. Th ey concluded that the 
tendency for board members to remain longer on the board of directors has a negative 
infl uence on the fi rm’s degree of international diversifi cation. Th eir research fi ndings do 
not support the hypothesis related to the infl uence of a board’s international background 
on the fi rm’s degree of international diversifi cation. Finally, the authors argue that the 
most internationalised enterprises require a higher level of education for its members. 
Oxelheim et al. [2013] surveyed some 350 non-fi nancial listed Nordic fi rms during 
2001-2008. Th e authors found, unsurprisingly, that the nationality of foreign board 
members tends to match the nationality of foreign owners and the country in which a 
company cross-lists its shares. Th e fi ndings also suggest that a foreign strategic owner 
is associated with the appointment of a foreign board member. Moreover, fi rms with a 
higher percentage of foreign sales, more foreign ownership and whose shares are cross-
listed on foreign exchanges have more internationalised boards of directors. Despite 
the aforementioned fi nding, the authors do not claim unidirectional causality, as 
board internationalisation may drive, as well as be driven by, fi rm internationalisation. 
Furthermore, scholars argue that board participation by foreign directors is primarily 
related to fi nancial internationalisation, rather than foreign sales and hence, presumably, 
to monitoring rather than advisory functions. A large fi rm size is positively linked with the 
presence of foreign directors, as smaller companies may fi nd it diffi  cult to attract foreign 
directors to their boards.
Earlier studies indicate that there is ambiguous support for the impact of board 
characteristics upon either internationalisation, in general, or the FDI decision, in 
particular. Researchers are not certain about the causality between board composition 
and internationalisation, as board internationalisation may drive, as well as be driven by, a 
fi rm’s internationalisation. Despite the aforementioned ambiguities, some earlier research 
results, on foreign board members, suggest that a connection seems to exist between 
foreign ownership, the scope and intensity of foreign business activities and the role of 
foreigners on the board of directors of a fi rm. It is worth observing that foreign directors 
more frequently hold a monitoring function position rather than that of an advisory role 
in an enterprise, i. e. foreign board members more oft en act as fi nancial controllers sent by 
the foreign owners, rather than as business developers.
3. Research results
3.1. General fi ndings
Nearly 100  foreigners have been accepted to the boards of directors of Russia’s 
50  largest corporations. In other words, almost two foreigners operate in each of these 
enterprises, on average. Even if further studies are required, it might well be that the boards 
of Russia’s largest corporations are more international than those of their counterparts in 
China or the USA, for instance.
A foreign board member is a more frequent acquaintance in Russia’s biggest investors 
abroad, than in Russia’s largest corporations, as a whole. Almost 30 % of all board seats 
are occupied by foreigners in the 10  enterprises with the biggest assets abroad. Th e 
respective share in Russia’s 50  largest corporations is 20 %. Th is fi nding implies that 
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there is a correlation between an intensive FDI expansion abroad and a larger foreign 
representation on the board of directors. Less than 10 % of the board seats of Russia’s 
largest state-owned companies have been given to foreigners, while the respective share 
in privately-owned fi rms is nearly 30 %. Th is fi nding could easily be anticipated, since 
the state-owned enterprises are usually less keen on inviting foreigners onto their boards 
(Fig. 1 and the Appendix).
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Fig. 1. Foreign board directors in Russia’s 10  biggest investors abroad and 50  largest corporations 
(divided by nationality)
N o t e :  AT (Austria), BE (Belgium), CH (Switzerland), CN (China), CZ (the Czech Republic), DE (Germany), 
DK (Denmark), FI (Finland), FR (France), GB (Great Britain), HU (Hungary), IT (Italy), JP (Japan), LB (Lebanon), LU 
(Luxemburg), NL (the Netherlands), NO (Norway), NZ (New Zealand), PL (Poland), SE (Sweden), US (the United States 
of America), ZA (South Africa).
Over 20 nationalities can be found in the board rooms of the studied corporations. 
British, American and German board directors occupy approximately half of the board 
seats that foreigners have received, in Russia’s largest corporations. A Chinese board 
director is still a rarity in Russia’s most signifi cant fi rms. In fact, just two Chinese citizens 
have found their way onto a board. In contrast, board members from South Africa are, 
surprisingly, oft en represented in the analysed companies, despite the fact that South 
African companies have invested practically nothing in Russia, and in turn, these Russian 
fi rms, in general, do not possess strategically valuable assets in Africa. To put it diff erently, 
neither the foreign ownership nor the external operational environment (Africa) have 
forced the Russians to invite South Africans onto their boards of directors. It is also 
interesting to note that that the share of the Austrians in the Russian boards is somewhat 
higher than the share of Austria in the Russian inward FDI stock, which was 1.7 % [Central 
Bank of Russia Russian Direct Investment…, 2016]. All of the Austrian board members 
operate in metallurgy. Th e overrepresentation of Austrians and South Africans on the 
Russian boards would require an empirical study.
Russia’s metallurgical companies have accepted the greatest number of foreigners onto 
their boards of directors. More than a quarter of all of the seats given to foreigners can be 
found in metallurgy. Metallurgy is followed by the oil and gas sector. A fi ft h of foreigner 
board seats are in the oil and gas industry. Th e American board directors play a visible 
role in Russia’s oil and energy industry. In particular, Americans can be found in Russia’s 
biggest investors abroad. Foreign board seats, in Russia’s banking sector, have been rather 
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equally divided among eight nationalities. Scandinavians especially occupy board seats 
in mobile telecommunications. British and Dutch board members are relatively frequent 
acquaintances in the Russian retail trade. And, German board seats are located rather 
evenly across Russia’s industries (Table 3).
Table 3.  Foreign board directors in Russia’s 10 biggest investors abroad and 50 largest corporations 
(divided by industry and turnover)
Industry/turnover Below $5 billion $5–10 billion Over $10 billion
Oil and gas (18)
Total: 10
2 FR, 2 JP, 1 BE, 1 CH,
1 DE, 1 GB, 1 HU, 1 ZA
Total: 8
5 US, 1 CH, 1 DE, 1 GB
Banking (9) Total: 31 CZ, 1 US, 1 ZA
Total: 6
1 DE, 1 FI, 1 FR, 1 GB,
1 IT, 1 US
Transport & logistics (4) Total: 21 GB, 1 LB
Total: 2
2 DE (1+1)
Metallurgy (24)
Total: 24
5 US (3+2), 5 AT (2+3),
5 GB (2+3), 3 ZA (1+2),
1 CN, 1 DE, 1 FI, 1 IT,
1 NL, 1 PL
Telecom (9) Total: 43 SE, 1 GB
Total: 5
2 NO, 1 DK, 1 GB, 1 US
Production of metal 
pipelines (2)
Total: 2
2 US
Retail trade (14) Total: 96 GB, 3 NL
Total: 5
1 DE, 1 FR, 1 GB, 1 PL,
1 US
Electric power & coal (7)
Total: 6
2 DE, 1 BE, 1 GB, 1 NZ,
1 US
Total: 1
1 US
Petrochemicals (1) Total: 11 CN
Multi-industry (4) Total: 43 GB, 1 LU
Grand total (92) (26) (39) (26)
N o t e :  Foreigners in Russia’s biggest investors abroad have been marked in bold, in the table above.
3.2. Research fi ndings related to Russia’s 10 largest fi rms investing abroad 
In the following, the internationalisation and the board composition of Russia’s 
10 biggest fi rms investing overseas are analysed, case by case. At the end of these 10 brief 
case studies, a table summarising the main fi ndings is provided. Th e analysis is begun with 
Gazprom, Russia’s biggest investor abroad. At the end of 2014, the total value of Gazprom’s 
foreign assets reached $36 billion, meaning that its foreign assets accounted for 13 % of the 
corporation’s total assets [Kuznetsov, 2016].
1. Gazprom: the majority of Gazprom is owned by the Russian State. Th e corporation 
is the globe’s leading natural gas producer. In 2015, Gazprom produced nearly 
420 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas. With the aforementioned production, Gazprom 
Вестник СПбГУ. Экономика. 2017. Т. 33. Вып. 3 459
was responsible for a tenth of the global gas production and two-thirds of Russia’s gas 
output. Approximately 225 bcm of Gazprom’s gas was exported, i.e. more than 50 % of 
the corporation’s gas production. Since the export price for natural gas is higher than the 
domestic gas price in Russia, Gazprom received nearly three-quarters of its revenues from 
its exports. Gazprom has a presence in most European countries. In addition to Europe, 
Gazprom has established a presence in Africa, the Americas and Asia [Gazprom, 2017a 
PJSC Gazprom Annual Report 2015…]. Viktor Zubkov, the Prime Minister of Russia 
in 2007–2008, acts as the chairman of the Gazprom Board. In addition to the former 
Prime Minister, the Minister of Energy, Alexander Novak, and the Minister of Economic 
Development2. None of the 11 board members of Gazprom can be considered a foreigner, 
according to the classifi cation of a foreigner used in this study (see Chapter 2  for the 
defi nition). On the other hand, the board has established a close connection to the Kazakh 
President, since one of Gazprom’s Board Members previously served as a part-time advisor 
to the president of Kazakhstan3 [Gazprom, 2017b [Board of Directors, 2017. Gazprom…; 
Grey et al., 2015].
Th e board members’ educational backgrounds are mainly Russian, the majority 
having studied at Russia’s top universities. Only one of the board members has reported 
that he had studied abroad and only one of the board members has experience working 
in a foreign fi rm based outside the former USSR. Around half of the board members have 
a personal, educational or professional connection to St Petersburg (Leningrad), the city 
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin comes from.
Taking into account the huge corporate responsibility, the average age of the board 
is surprisingly young(55 years), the oldest member being 75 years old and the youngest 
one being under 40 years. Th e board of Gazprom is highly masculine, since no female 
directors acted as a member of the board at the beginning of 2017  [Gazprom 2017b]. 
[Board of Directors, 2017. Gazprom…].
2. Lukoil: the corporation’s fi rst international operation took place in Azerbaijan, in 
1994. Now, the company is present in over 30 countries. Lukoil is one of the world’s largest 
oil companies accounting 
for over 2 % of the global crude oil production, in 2015. Almost 20 % of the 
corporation’s production took place outside of Russia [Lukoil Annual Report, 2015…]. 
Lukoil’s foreign assets are 
valued at more than $30 billion and they cover nearly 30 % of the company’s total 
assets, indicating that the corporation is both committed to international operations and 
highly dependent on them, at the same time [Kuznetsov, 2016].
Th e Lukoil Board has 10 members. Two of the Russian board members have acted as 
a deputy minister in the Soviet energy ministry. One of them, namely Vagit Alekperov, has 
managed to collect an extraordinarily huge ownership stake in the company (over 20 %). 
2 Alexey Ulyukaev used to be a board member of Gazprom prior his arrest in mid-November 2016 for 
corruption [Corruption charges against a minister signal…, 2016]. Th e corruption allegation is not linked 
to Gazprom. 
3 Timur Askarovich Kulibaev holds Kazakh citizenship, but as he was born in Almaty, the Soviet Re-
public of Kazakhstan, he is not regarded as a foreigner in this study. Kulibaev is the son-in-law of Kazakh 
President Nursultan Nazarbaev [Th e World’s Billionaires…]. In addition to Kulibaev, Alexander Novak was 
born outside the Russian Federation, namely in the Soviet Republic of Ukraine [PJSC Gazprom Annual 
Report 2015…].
460 Вестник СПбГУ. Экономика. 2017. Т. 33. Вып. 3
In addition, Igor Ivanov, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Aff airs, 1998–2004, and Secretary of 
the Security Council, 2004–2007, brings government knowledge to the board.
Th e company’s 2015 annual report reveals that the Russian board members have not 
extensively studied abroad and that their international work experience is surprisingly 
scarce. Th e average age of the board (70 years) is even more surprising, since oil business 
is generally regarded as a dynamic business fi eld. Th e chairman of the Lukoil Board will 
celebrate his 90th birthday in this decade [Lukoil Annual Report, 2015…; Lukoil — Board 
of Directors, 2015… ]. Such a board age structure does not necessarily give an impression 
of experience and dynamism, but rather an impression of seniority and immobility.
Foreigners occupy 40 % of the Lukoil Board seats, i.e. two Americans, one Briton, and 
one Swiss have managed to acquire a board seat. Interestingly, only one of the foreigners 
can be considered as a heavyweight in the international oil business, which indicates 
that business experience has not been the main criterion for choosing the foreign board 
members. Th is may indicate that the foreign directors in Lukoil exercise more of a 
controlling function rather than playing an advisory role on the board. On the other hand, 
the foreign directors are well-connected in the business circles of their own societies. 
For example, foreign board members have memberships in their national chambers of 
commerce, business associations and clubs linked to Russia that allows them to infl uence 
the image of Russia back home. One female director has found her way into this masculine 
fi eld of business [Lukoil– Board of Directors, 2015…].
3. VimpelCom: even if the company’s headquarters are currently located in the Neth-
erlands and the principal owner is nominally from Luxembourg, the company can still be 
regarded as Russian, since it is controlled by Russia’s second richest oligarch, Mikhail Frid-
man [Forbes 2017 Th e World’s Billionaires, 2017…]. Th e company is one of the world’s 
largest mobile service providers, in terms of customers. Th e corporation has over 200 mil-
lion customers, in over 10 countries. Russia is the main clientele base, with nearly 60 mil-
lion customers. In 2014, VimpelCom’s assets abroad were valued at around $30 billion and 
three-quarters of the company’s assets were located outside the Russian borders [Kuznets-
ov, 2016]. When VimpelCom’s skyrocketing internationalisation is assessed, it needs to be 
remembered that the company’s foreign expansion only began in 2004, when VimpelCom 
entered the Kazakh market [VimpelCom Annual Report 2015…].
Five out of nine board members are foreigners and they are mainly from Scandinavia. 
Th e ownership of Telenor, a Norwegian telecom, explains the large representation of 
Scandinavians on the VimpelCom Board. Four Russians serve the supervisory board, of 
whom one is its chairman. Mikhail Fridman holds a board seat in the company, as well.
Th e board members have received their education from some of the most respected 
educational institutions throughout Europe and the USA. Th eir formal experience, related 
to either the Russian Government or other national governments, is rather narrow. Only 
one board member reported that he had worked in the Norwegian ministry. When 
assessing this member’s government experience, one became aware that his ministerial 
career dates back to the end of the 1970s and the 1980s, and that it is not in the fi eld of 
telecommunications. 
Th e VimpelCom board is relatively young, i.e. the average age of the supervisory board 
is just 53 years. Th is young age can be seen as a comparative advantage in a highly dynamic 
fi eld of business. No females have entered the VimpelCom board, as yet [VimpelCom 
Supervisory Board 2017…].
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4) Rosneft : the corporation is Russia’s largest oil producer, accounting for almost 40 % 
of the country’s oil production. With a 5 % global share, Rosneft  is the world’s second 
largest oil producer, aft er Saudi Arabian Aramco. Rosneft  was a domestic market-oriented 
corporation, until the early years of this millennium, but its international expansion has 
since sped up. As a result of this internationalisation, the company has established its 
substantial presence, in over 20 countries [Rosneft  2017a Rosneft  Annual Report 2015…]. 
Despite top management’s growing interest in foreign expansion, Rosneft  has only lightly 
invested outside Russian borders; taking into consideration its substantial size. Th e group’s 
foreign assets are valued at less than $10 billion and just 6 % of the enterprise’s total assets 
were located abroad [Kuznetsov, 2016]. 
Th e Rosneft  Board is formed of nine members, with an average age of 60 years. No 
females have been accepted to the board of directors. Four board directors are foreigners, 
i. e. three US citizens and a German. None of the Russian board members reported that 
they had studied abroad and only one provided information about international working 
experience.
Th e board seems to be well connected with the Russian president, as the chairman 
of the board is an assistant to the Russian president. Besides, Rosneft ’s Vice-chairman 
Igor Sechin presumably has a close connection to the Russian president, since he acted as 
deputy head of the executive offi  ce of the Russian president in 2000–2008, and thereaft er, 
he served as deputy prime minister, until 2012. Moreover, the incumbent Russian minister 
of energy holds a seat on the board. Another infl uential personality, Andrey Akimov, who 
is a member of the Gazprom Board as well, needs to be mentioned here. German board 
member Matthias Warnig, Managing Director of Nord Stream 2, is another noteworthy 
personality. BP, in turn, has added its president to the Rosneft  Board. A former senior 
director of ExxonMobil also holds a seat [Rosneft  Board of directors 2017…].
5) Evraz: the headquarters of this metallurgical company have been located in 
London for a decade. Despite the location of its headquarters in Great Britain, Evraz can 
be classifi ed as a Russian-controlled company, as approximately 80 % of its share capital is 
held by Russian tycoons [Evraz (2017a) Board of directors…; Forbes (2017) Th e World’s 
Billionaires…].
Th e company started its expansion outside the former USSR, in 2005. Now, Evraz is 
present in eight foreign countries, namely Canada, the Czech Republic, Italy, Kazakhstan, 
Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the USA. In 2015, foreign markets 
accounted for more than half of Evraz’ steel sales [Evraz (2017a) Board of directors…]. 
At the end of 2014, the Evraz foreign assets totalled $5  billion, which is nearly half of 
the corporation’s total asset value [Kuznetsov, 2016]. Despite the fact that the main metal 
deposits of Evraz are located in Russia, the large share of foreign sales and foreign assets 
makes the fi rm highly dependent on foreign markets.
Th e Evraz Board consists of eight members, whose average age is 57 years. Th e private 
ownership of the company has probably infl uenced the owners to ensure that it is free 
from high-level civil servants. In other words, the board consists more of business-minded 
directors than of government-sent supervisors. Th ree out of eight of its board members 
are foreigners. Two come from Great Britain and the third board member is from Austria. 
One woman has found a seat on the Evraz Board [Evraz (2017b) Board of directors…].
6) Sovcomfl ot (SCF): the enterprise is Russia’s largest shipping company and one 
of the world’s largest fi rms in the shipment of crude oil, petroleum products, liquefi ed 
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natural gas (LNG) and petroleum gas. SCF has nearly 150 vessels, with a total deadweight 
of 12 million tonnes. Th e company’s oil tankers cover over 90 % of these deadweight tonnes 
[SCF Group — Annual Report 2015…]. SCF foreign assets exceed 80 % of the fi rm’s total 
assets, which gives a clear indication that fl agging ships overseas plays an elementary 
role in the overall internationalisation of Sovcomfl ot [Kuznetsov, 2016]. Tax planning is 
probably behind the fl agging of the ships abroad.
SFC has nine board members, with an average age of 59 years. Th e chairman of the 
board previously acted as a representative of the Russian president for the North-West 
Federal District and three of the board members have previously served as a deputy 
minister in the Russian government. It is interesting to note that two SCF board members 
are also members of Zarubezhneft , Russia’s 10th biggest investor abroad. None of the 
directors on the board are women.
Two of SFC’s directors are foreigners, one being a Briton and the other a Lebanese 
citizen with a close connection to US business circles. Previously, the British citizen was 
involved with Lloyd’s Register and the Lebanese citizen worked for Morgan Stanley. Th us, 
these foreign board members bring to the Sovcomfl ot Board additional expertise on 
international shipping and international fi nance.
7) Rusal: the corporation is the world’s largest producer of aluminium. It accounted 
for nearly 7 % of the global aluminium output, in 2015. Rusal’s internationalisation began 
in 2002, when the company acquired a foil mill in Armenia and a mining complex in 
Guinea. By now, the company has established its  business presence in a dozen foreign 
countries, namely Armenia, Australia, China, Guinea, Guyana, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, 
Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Sweden and Ukraine [Rusal 2017a Facts and Figures, 2017. Rusal…]. 
Th e value of Rusal’s foreign assets was estimated to have reached almost $3 billion, as of 
the end of 2014, representing a fi ft h of Rusal’s total assets [Kuznetsov, 2016].
Rusal has an surprisingly large board with 18  directors. Th e Rusal Board size is 
approximately twice as large as the average board size, in companies of similar size. Th e 
average age of the Rusal Board is 53 years. As the metal business is regarded as a rather 
masculine fi eld of business, it is surprising to encounter four women on the board, with 
one of them being a foreigner.
None of the Russian board members have served the Russian Government. Should 
the Russian board members lack government experience, some foreign board members 
have had formal links to the governmental structures within their countries, such as Philip 
Lader, former White House deputy chief of staff , and Elsie Leung Oi-Sie, a committee 
member of the National People’s Congress of China. Another infl uential foreign board 
member should be mentioned here, Matthias Warnig, the German managing director 
of Gazprom-controlled Nord Stream 2 and is a board member of Rosneft  and Transneft  
[Rusal 2017b [Board of Directors, 2017. Rusal…]
8) Russian Railways (RZD): the corporation, with over 800,000  employees, is 
responsible for over 80,000 kilometres of rail network, i. e. the RZD railroads are long 
enough to wrap twice around the globe. Th e company accounts for nearly 90 % of Russia’s 
total freight turnover, excluding pipeline transport, and 25 % of the country’s total passenger 
turnover. Russian Railways currently carries passengers to 30 countries in Europe and Asia 
[Russian Railways, 2017…]. Th e foreign assets of RZD totalled approximately $3 billion, 
as of the end of 2014, representing 4 % of the RZD total assets [Kuznetsov, 2016].
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Th e company’s 12-member board is led by the incumbent deputy prime minister. 
In addition to the deputy prime minister, the company has substantial government 
experience, as Russia’s ex-prime minister, two deputy ministers and a former deputy 
minister sit on the board. In other words, almost half of the RZD Board has some sort of 
ministerial experience. Despite such a wide ministerial praxis, the average age of the board 
is surprisingly low, i. e. approximately 52 years. No females have gained membership on 
the RZD Board.
Several board members have studied at the world’s leading universities, such as 
Harvard Business School, Stanford University and Wharton School of Business. Although 
some members of the board have studied abroad and have gained foreign fi rm-related 
working experience, one may conclude that the board’s knowledge in international 
business is somewhat narrow.
One of the RZD board members is a foreigner, namely German Hartmut Medorn. 
Until May 2009, Hartmut Medorn served as CEO of Deutsche Bahn, Germany’s largest 
railway company. He is clearly the oldest board member at Russian Railways. Medorn 
celebrates his 75th birthday in July 2017  [Russian Railways 2017b [Board of Directors, 
2017. Russian Railways…].
9) TMK: is a privately-owned fi rm. It is one of the globe’s leading producers of steel 
pipes for the oil and gas industry. In 2015, pipe shipments for the company totalled nearly 
four million tonnes. Th e Russian market is the stronghold of TMK. Th e exports formed 
just a quarter of the company’s total revenues, in 2015. In 2006, the company started 
its foreign production in Romania. Currently, TMK operates in Canada, Kazakhstan, 
Oman, Romania and the USA [TMK 2017a TMK, 2017]. Th e enterprise’s foreign assets 
were valued at $2.5 billion, at the end of 2014, representing over 40 % of its total assets 
[Kuznetsov, 2016].
Th e TMK board consists of 12  members. Th e average age of the board members 
is 55 years. No females have received a seat on the board. Even if the TMK Board has 
been built around professionalism, two former ministers have received a seat on the 
board. Th ese two board members are rather unique personalities, since they have also 
gained broad business experience. One of them is the president of the Russian Union of 
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and the other one is the chairman of Rusnano.
Two foreigners have entered the TMK Board. Both of them are US citizens and both 
of them are highly experienced in international fi nance and doing business in Russia. It is 
rather peculiar that one of the foreign directors has previously served as press offi  cer for 
the US Treasury Department [TMK 2017b TMK Board of Directors, 2015… ].
10) Zarubezhneft : the company was founded in 1967. Since the beginning of its 
operations and until the year 1990, Zarubezhneft  was “a key foreign agent” of the Soviet oil 
industry abroad. Its global activities during the Soviet era covered over 30 countries. Th e 
company currently has assets in Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cuba, and Vietnam 
[Zarubezhneft  2017a Zarubezhneft , 2017]. Th e value of these foreign assets was $2.4 billion, 
at the end of 2014. Th e foreign operations are of strategic importance to Zarubezhneft , as 
two-thirds of the enterprise’s assets are located abroad [Kuznetsov, 2016].
Th e board of directors consists of seven directors. At the time of writing this article, 
the chairman was Eugeniy Murov, a former KGB offi  cer. In addition to the security 
connection, the board also possesses earlier ministerial experience and broad knowledge 
of the oil business. Some of the board members have been educated in the leading 
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educational institutions of Russia and Western Europe. Neither foreigners nor females 
have entered the board of Zarubezhneft . All in all, Zarubeshneft  has relatively young 
board, 54–55 years [Zarubeshneft  2017b Board of Directors, 2017. Zarubezhneft …].
3.3. A summary of the main research fi ndings 
To sum up, the board size of Russia’s 50  largest corporations varies from fi ve to 
18 members, the average number being 10. Th e board size is slightly larger in state-owned 
enterprises than in private fi rms. However, the size diff erence is not signifi cant. Industry 
membership does not explain the board size diff erences. No major diff erences in board 
size could be detected between Russia’s 50 largest corporations and the country’s 10 biggest 
investors abroad (Table 4 and the Appendix).
Th e lowest average age, of these boards in Russia’s 10 biggest fi rms investing overseas, 
was 52 years old, while the highest was 70 years old. Surprisingly, the lowest average age 
was in the state-owned Russian Railways and the highest average age was in the privately 
driven oil company, Lukoil. It is interesting to note that the foreign board members were 
oft en older than the average age of their board. Th e average age of the foreign board 
members, in Russia’s 10 biggest investors abroad, was 62 years. By selecting older foreigners 
for their boards, the Russian corporations may receive more experience, but whether or 
not they also receive the necessary dynamism and the latest corporate governance know-
how is already a debatable issue. 
Th ree out of Russia’s 10  biggest investors abroad have invited at least one woman 
onto their board. One can fi nd six female board members in Russia’s 10 biggest investors 
abroad. Th ree of these female directors were foreign citizens and another three Russians, 
which means that females occupy around 5 % of the board seats in Russia’s 10  biggest 
fi rms investing outside the country. Th e situation for female directors in Russia’s 50 largest 
corporations is, more or less, the same (6 %). Th e aforementioned fi nding indicates that 
the internationalisation of Russian companies has not improved the chances for women 
to enter the board of directors, and hence, it can be concluded that Russia is still a rather 
masculine working environment. However, Russia is not an exemption, when we approach 
gender equality, from a global perspective.
Table 4.  A summary of foreign board directors in Russia’s 10 biggest investors abroad
Company, 
founding year,
headquarters
Ownership 
Foreigners/
total number of 
board members
Foreign board members 
(assumed citizenship), 
excl. persons born in the 
ex-USSR
Gazprom, 
1989/1993, 
Moscow, Russia
State-owned: the Russian Government 
owns more than 50 %, the rest being on 
free fl oat
0/11
Average age:
nearly 55 years.
No female 
members.
No foreigners
Lukoil, 
1991/1993, 
Moscow, Russia
Privately-owned: Lukoil management 
35 %, including Vagit Alekperov 23 % and 
Leonid Fedun 10 %, Lukoil Investments 
Cyprus Ltd 16 %, others 55 %
4/10
Average age:
70 years.
One female 
member
Toby Gati (US), Richard 
Matzke (US), Roger 
Munnings (GB), Ivan 
Pictet (CH)
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Company, 
founding year,
headquarters
Ownership 
Foreigners/
total number of 
board members
Foreign board members 
(assumed citizenship), 
excl. persons born in the 
ex-USSR
VimpelCom, 
1992, 
Amsterdam, Th e 
Netherlands
Privately-owned: LetterOne (a 
Luxembourg-based holding company 
of Russian Altimo) 48 %, Telenor (a 
Norwegian state-controlled company) 
24 %, Th e Stichting Foundation 8 %, and 
free fl oat 20 % of the voting rights
5/9
Average age:
53 years.
No female 
members
Gennady Gazin (US), 
Gunnar Holt (NO), 
Julian Horn-Smith 
(GB), Jørn Jensen (DK), 
Nils Katla (NO)
Rosneft , 1993, 
Moscow, Russia
State-owned: fully state-owned 
Rosneft egaz 50 %, BP Russian Investments 
Ltd 20 %, QHG Shares Pte 20 %, National 
Settlement Depository 10 %
4/9
Average age:
60 years.
No female 
members
Robert Dudley (US), 
Donald Humpreys (US), 
Guillermo Quintero 
(US), Matthias Warnig 
(DE)
Evraz, 1992, 
London, Great 
Britain
Privately-owned: ultimate benefi cial 
owners are Roman Abramovich 31 %, 
Alexander Abramov 21 %, Alexander 
Frolov 11 %, Gennady Kozovoy 6 %, 
Alexander Vagin 6 %, Eugene Shvidler 
3 %, on free fl oat some 22 %
3/8
Average age:
around 
57 years.
One female 
member
Karl Gruber (AT), 
Deborah Gudgeon 
(GB), Michael Peat (GB)
Sovcomfl ot 
(SFC), 1973/1988,
St. Petersburg, 
Russia
State-owned: Russian Government 100 % 2/9
Average age:
Some 59 years.
No female 
members
Walid Chammah (LB), 
David Moorhouse (GB)
Rusal, 2000, 
Moscow, Russia
Privately-owned: En+ 48 %, Onexim 
Group 14 %, SUAL 16 %, Amokenga 
Holdings 9 %, Rusal management 0.25 %, 
free fl oat 13 %
9/18
Average age:
some 53 years.
Four female 
members
Mark Garber (US), Ivan 
Glasenberg (ZA), Philip 
Lader (US), Elsie Leung 
Oi-Sie (CN), Marco 
Musetti (IT), Matthias 
Warnig (DE), Siegfried 
Wolf (AT), Daniel Lesin 
Wolfe (US), Bernard 
Zonneveld (NL)
Russian 
Railways (RZD), 
1837/2003, 
Moscow, Russia
State-owned: Russian Government 100 % 1/12
Average age:
some 52 years.
No female 
members
Hartmut Medorn (DE)
TMK, 2001, 
Moscow, Russia
Privately-owned: TMK Steel Ltd 68 % (the 
main benefi ciary Dmitry Pumpyanskiy, 
Chairman of Board), free fl oat 32 %
2/12
Average age:
55 years
No female 
members
Peter O´Brien (US), 
Robert Foresman (US)
Zarubezhneft , 
1967, Moscow, 
Russia
State-owned: Russian Government 100 % 0/7
Average age:
54-55 years.
No female 
members
No Foreigners
TOTAL 10 – 30/105
(28,6 %)
–
N o t e :  Foreign female board members have been marked in bold in the table above.
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Conclusion 
Th e boards of Russia’s 50 largest corporations are more international than generally 
believed, every fi ft h board member is a foreigner, born outside the former USSR. Th e 
respective share is 30 % in Russia’s biggest enterprises investing abroad. Th is fi nding is 
in line with the results of Oxelheim et al. [2013], who argued that there is a relationship 
between an outward FDI activity and the internalisation of the boards. In order to verify 
whether the outbound investments have caused the board internationalisation or vice 
versa, the entry dates of the foreign board members and the timing of the main FDI 
deals should be investigated. Even if further studies are required, the author would not be 
amazed, if the outward FDI was the driver for board internationalisation in the Russian 
context and not vice versa.
Th is research suggests that foreign board members exercise both a monitoring 
function and an advisory function in the Russian corporations. In other words, the 
foreign board members act as both the foreign owners’ watchdogs and as the Russian 
owners’ business advisors. In addition to these two conventional roles, some foreign board 
members, due to their political background, may be used for unoffi  cial dialogues between 
Russia and foreign countries. In this context, it needs to be mentioned that Russia’s largest 
state-owned enterprises usually have signifi cant ministerial expertise and experience. Th e 
penetration of the former employees of the Russian security organs into the corporate 
governance of Russia’s largest corporations would deserved a closer study.
When Russia’s 50 largest corporations are analysed, it becomes evident that private 
fi rms have more foreigners on their boards than do the state-owned enterprises. 
Less than 10 % of the board seats of Russia’s largest state-owned enterprises have been 
off ered to foreigners. Th e corresponding share in private fi rms is nearly 30 %. Despite 
the aforementioned fi nding, one can fi nd as many state-owned enterprises in Russia’s 
10 biggest investors abroad as in private fi rms. Th us, industry membership, i.e. the fi eld 
of a fi rm’s operation, may explain the outward FDI expansion more than the corporate 
governance characteristics do.
Women occupy around 5 % of the board seats in Russia’s 10 biggest investors abroad. 
Th e share of female directors in Russia’s 50 largest corporations is more or less the same. 
Th is fi nding implies that the internationalisation of Russian companies has not improved 
the chances for women to enter the board of directors.
To end, under the political ice age between Russia and the West, it would be interesting 
to follow how the number of the Chinese board members, in Russia’s most signifi cant 
enterprises, develops in the future. 
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Appendix. Russia’s 50 largest corporations and foreigners in their board of directors
Rank
Company, fi eld 
of business, main 
ownership
Turnover 
2016
($ billion) *
Foreigners/total 
number of board 
members **
Foreign board members (assumed citizenship),
excl. persons born in the ex-USSR **
 1 Gazprom, oil and 
gas, state 87.4 0/11
No foreigners.
 2 Lukoil, oil and 
gas, private 77.2 4/10
Toby Gati (US), Richard Matzke (US),
Roger Munnings (GB), Ivan Pictet (CH)
 3 Rosneft , oil and 
gas, state 61.5 4/9
Robert Dudley (US), Donald Humpreys (US),
Guillermo Quintero (US), Matthias Warnig 
(DE)
 4 Sberbank, 
banking, state 39.8 4/14
Esko Aho (FI), Martin Grant Gilman (US),
Alessandro Profumo (IT), Nadya Wells (GB)
 5 RZD, rail 
transport, state 22.5 1/12
Hartmut Medorn (DE)
 6 VTB, banking, 
state 17.9 2/11
Yves Th ibault de Silguy (FR), Matthias Warnig 
(DE)
 7 Surgutneft egas, 
oil and gas, 
private
15.0 0/9
No foreigners.
 8 Magnit, retail 
trade, private 14.2 0/7
No foreigners.
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Rank
Company, fi eld 
of business, main 
ownership
Turnover 
2016
($ billion) *
Foreigners/total 
number of board 
members **
Foreign board members (assumed citizenship),
excl. persons born in the ex-USSR **
 9 Transneft , oil 
logistics, state 12.2 1/8
Matthias Warnig (DE)
10 X5 Retail Group, 
retail trade, 
private
12.1 4/8
Christian Couvreux (FR), Stephan DuCharme 
(US & DE), Geoff rey King (GB), Pawel Musial 
(PL)
11 Inter RAO 
UES, electricity 
trading, state
12.0 1/11
Ronald James Pollet (US)
12 Rosseti,energy 
grid operator, 
state
11.4 0/15
No foreigners.
13 Sistema, 
conglomerate, 
private
10.6 4/11
Patrick Clanwilliam (GB), Jeannot Krecké 
(LU),
Peter Mandelson (GB), Roger Munnings (GB)
14 Megapolis, 
logistics, private  8.7 0/7
No foreigners.
15 Tatneft , oil and 
gas, state  8.2 2/15
Laszlo Gerech (HU), René Steiner (CH)
16 Evraz, 
metallurgy, 
private
 8.0 3/8
Karl Gruber (AT), Deborah Gudgeon (GB),
Michael Peat (GB)
17 Rusal, 
metallurgy, 
private 7.9 9/18
Mark Garber (US), Ivan Glasenberg (ZA), 
Philip Lader (US), Marco Musetti (IT), Elsie 
Leung Oi-Sie (CN),
Matthias Warnig (DE), Siegfried Wolf (AT),
Daniel Lesin Wolfe (US), Bernard Zonneveld 
(NL)
18 Bashneft , oil and 
gas, state  7.6 2/10
Kasimiro Dide (BE), Kristof Nering
19 Norilsk Nickel, 
metallurgy, 
private
 7.6 3/13
Robert Edwards (GB), Gareth Penny (ZA),
Gerhardus Prinsloo (ZA)
20 NLMK, 
metallurgy,
private
 7.3 4/9
Benedict Sciortino (US), Franz Struzl (AT),
Tomasz Veraszto (AT), Helmut Wieser (AT)
21 Novatek, oil and 
gas, private  7.1 3/9
Burckhard Bergmann (DE), Michael Borrell 
(GB),
Robert Castaigne (FR)
22 Aerofl ot, air 
transport, state  6.2 0/11
No foreigners
23 Gazprombank, 
banking, state  6.0 0/12
No foreigners
24 Severstal, 
metallurgy, 
private
 5.7 3/10
Alun Bowen (GB), Philip Dayer (GB), Sakari 
Tamminen (FI)
25 Sibur, 
petrochemicals, 
private
 5.7 1/10
Chang Zhenyong (CN)
470 Вестник СПбГУ. Экономика. 2017. Т. 33. Вып. 3
Rank
Company, fi eld 
of business, main 
ownership
Turnover 
2016
($ billion) *
Foreigners/total 
number of board 
members **
Foreign board members (assumed citizenship),
excl. persons born in the ex-USSR **
26 Sakhalin energy, 
oil and gas, 
private
 5.6 4/12
Roger Hickman (ZA), Shota Kondo (JP),
Olivier Lazare (FR), Kazumasa Miyazawa (JP)
27 VimpelCom, 
telecom, private  5.6 5/9
Gennady Gazin (US), Gunnar Holt (NO),
Julian Horn-Smith (GB), Jørn Jensen (DK), 
Nils Katla (NO) 
28 Magnitogorsk 
Iron & Steel 
Works, 
metallurgy, 
private
 5.3 2/10
Valeriy Martsinovich (PL), Ralph Morgan 
(US)
29 United Aircraft  
Corporation, 
machine 
building, state
 5.3 0/11
No foreigners
30 Rushydro, 
hydropower, state  5.2 0/13
No foreigners
31 Auchan, retail 
trade, foreign-
owned subsidiary
 5.1 Not applicable
Not applicable
32 UGMKZ, 
metallurgy, 
private
 5.0 No data
No foreigners
33 Megafon, 
telecom,
private  4.7 4/7
Robert Andersson (SE), Paul Myners (GB),
Jan Rutberg (SE), Ingrid Maria Stenmark 
(SE)
34 T Plus, electric 
power, private  4.6 3/12
Dirk Beeuwsaert (BE), Peter O’Brien (US),
Roger Wills (NZ)
35 Rostelecom, 
telecom, state  4.4 0/11
No foreigners
36 Stroygaz-
montazh, 
construction 
works for oil and 
gas industry, 
private
 4.2 No data
No data
37 United 
Shipbuilding 
Corporation, 
machine 
building, state
 4.2 0/11
No foreigners
38 Dixy, retail trade, 
private  4.1 2/9
Steven John Wellard (GB),
Alexander Arthur John Williams (GB)
39 Metalloinvest, 
metallurgy, 
private
 4.0 0/9
No foreigners
40 Rosenergoatom, 
electric power 
generation, state
 3.9 0/5
No foreigners
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Company, fi eld 
of business, main 
ownership
Turnover 
2016
($ billion) *
Foreigners/total 
number of board 
members **
Foreign board members (assumed citizenship),
excl. persons born in the ex-USSR **
41 Metro cash and 
carry, retail trade, 
foreign-owned 
subsidiary
 3.9 Not applicable
Not applicable
42 Otkritie, 
banking, private  3.8 0/5
No foreigners
43 Mechel, 
metallurgy, 
private
 3.8 0/9
No foreigners
44 Lenta, retail 
trade, private  3.8 7/9
Jan Dunning (NL), Martin Elling (NL), Steve 
Johnson (GB), Jago Lemmens (NL), Michael 
Lynch-Bell (GB),
John Olivier (GB), Stephen Peel (GB)
45 Alfa-Bank, 
banking, private  3.8 3/10
Andrew Baxter (ZA), Edward Kaufman (US),
Petr Smida (CZ)
46 SUEK, coal 
producer, private  3.8 3/9
Klaus-Dieter Beck (DE), Stefan Judisch (DE),
Iain Macdonald (GB)
47 TMK, 
production of 
metal pipelines, 
private
 3.8 2/12
Peter O´Brien (US), Robert Foresman (US)
48 Phillip Morris, 
tobacco industry, 
foreign-owned 
subsidiary
 3.5 Not applicable
Not applicable
49 Toyota Motor, 
car production, 
machine 
building, foreign-
owned subsidiary
 3.4 Not applicable
Not applicable
50 Alrosa, precious 
stones, state  3.4 0/15
No foreigners
Total 
50
– 588.0 90/456
(19.7 %) *
–
Note: Th e majority of Russia’s 10 biggest outward investors can be found among the country’s largest corporations. 
Th e biggest fi rms investing abroad have been marked with a yellow background colour, in the table above. Two of 
these companies, namely Sovcomfl ot and Zarubeshneft , did not qualify among Russia’s 50 largest corporations. As two 
foreigners operate on the board of Sofcomfl ot, one foreign board member possesses a dual citizenship, and the nationality 
of one board member could not be identifi ed, the total number of foreign board directors (90) in this table does not match 
with the total number of foreign directors in Table 4.
Foreign female board members have been marked in bold, in the table above.
Th e turnover fi gures were converted from RUR into USD, with an annual average rate from 2016, i. e. RUR 
67.0 against USD 1 [Bank of Finland (2017) Russia statistics, BOFIT…].
S o u r c e :  *Expert (2017) Эксперт 400 — рейтинг ведущих российских компаний; **company websites.
